EPP, PES, ALDE and the others: The European parties (for a complete list see here)
could be the key for a representative democracy on the European level,
but up to now they are hardly present in the public debate. Which role
should they play in the EU in future, and what is necessary to achieve
this? In a series of guest articles, representatives from politics and
science answer here to this question. Today: Michael Kaeding and Niko Switek. (To the start of the series.)
- “While research on Europarties has gained momentum, it remains a field with plentiful diamonds in the rough.”
Most scholars agree that political parties are a
necessary condition for modern democracies. Therefore focusing on
questions of transnational democratisation of the European Union
implies taking into account political parties on the European level,
so-called Europarties. Already in their early stage as transnational
party federations they were regarded as potential catalysts for more
European democracy and further integration. Yet their development has
been slow and academic research on this topic correspondingly
remained confined to a niche (Ladrech, 1999, Gaffney, 1999). But as
truly transnational Europarties entered “a state of becoming”
(Day, 2014) more recently, researchers increasingly turn to these
rather unique ‘parties of parties’.
In light of this blog’s special series on
European political parties we glance at the current state of the art
of academic work on Europarties. We identify four central areas of
academic interest: Europarties’ organisational evolution, internal
organisation, influence over EU policy-making, and their role in
transnational party building in new democracies. While research on
Europarties has noticeably gained momentum, it remains an
under-researched field of study with plentiful diamonds in the rough.
Organisational
evolution
European institutional reforms have profoundly
marked the organisational evolution of Europarties over the last
decades (Johansson, 2005). The introduction of Article 138A into the
Maastricht Treaty for the first time explicitly recognized the role
of “political parties at European level”. But only the insertion
of Article 191 into the EC Treaty and its amendment at Nice enabled a
statute for European parties along with rules regarding their funding
(Lightfood, 2006).
Afterwards particularly two transnational groups,
the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Party of European
Socialists (PES) developed genuinely European partisan structures, an
evolution that Bardi characterizes as a “two-speed party system
[with] an increasingly institutionalized core and a mutable and
unstable periphery” (1996: 99). Some scholars saw the Eastern
enlargement of the EU starting in 2004 as a major challenge,
expecting a dilution of ideological coherence on grounds of the
structural differences between Western and Eastern parties. Quite the
contrary Bressanelli sees a stronger organization and a rise in
coherence: “All in all, there is a clear potential for the
Europarties to play a representative role in the EU political system,
as the Treaty of Lisbon prescribes” (Bressanelli, 2014: 163).
In 2016, there are now 15
recognised Europarties,
however only four of them have mainly attracted scholarly attention:
the EPP (Hanley, 2004; Johansson, 2016), the PES (Ladrech, 1993;
Moschonas, 2004; Külhaci and Lightfoot, 2014), the Alliance of
Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE: Sandström, 2004;
Smith, 2014) and the European Green Party (EGP: Van de Walle, 2004;
Huan, 2009).
Internal
organization
Europarties are essentially made up of national
parties. Their internal organization predominantly depends on their
component national members and their respective internal ideological
cohesion. While Europarties mirror major political ideologies and map
established party families they nevertheless encompass a broad range
of national parties with specific policy platforms. The memberships
of some major parties, such as the Labour Party in the PES, Forza
Italia or Fidesz in the EPP, or the Swedish Greens in the EGP, can
give rise to internal tension breaking the “identity compromise”
(Delwit et al., 2004), and thereby destroying the possibilities to
build a consensus and exercise political impact.
In the case of the ALDE (Sandström, 2004),
varying notions of a liberal position lead to systematically strained
relationships between national member parties on the left-right
dimension, threatening ideological cohesion. In the EGP on the other
hand, especially the divisions regarding European integration have
hindered its development for quite some time (Van de Walle, 2004).
Given their strong internal ideological
heterogeneity, Klüver and Rodon (2013) study how Europarties still
manage to arrive at common policy positions. In order to explain
position formation within Europarties, they argue that national
parties compete with each other in an attempt to upload their own
policy positions to their Europarty. Klüver and Rondon conclude that
their ability to succeed in these attempts depends on their
legislative resources, i.e. the share of seats they control in the
European Parliament.
Regarding their organizational structure all
Europarties more or less share nearly the same internal organs:
congress, councils, a general secretariat reflecting a kind of
organizational mimicry as a result of the evolving European
institutional context. The same holds true for processes of policy
formulation, i.e. the formulation of election manifestos (Sigalas et
al., 2010). But even if one finds identical organizational components
among the various Europarties, their influence over EU policy-making
differs significantly.
Influence
over EU policy-making
How influential Europarties are regarding EU
policy-making is highly contested. While Johansson claims that by now
they managed to become more “relevant actors” (2005: 515),
Külahci and Lightfoot see only “weak influence” (2014: 71) due
to their inability to act and position themselves cohesively
(Külahci, 2010: 1283).
Van Hecke (2010) agrees but stresses the
difference of Europarties in comparison to national parties, which
has to result in a diverging understanding of influence. After all
Europarties do not have government-making power, and national party
politics continue to dominate European Parliament elections. But
Europarties do matter in offering partisan linkages between different
EU institutions, and in contributing to the increasing politicisation
of the EU polity. An interesting development in this respect are the
corresponding European political foundations, which are modelled
after the German Politische Stiftungen
and position themselves as think tanks supporting their partner
parties (Gagatek and Van Hecke, 2014).
Consequently, any level of influence of
Europarties over EU policy-making is strongly tied to their relations
with the European institutions (Delwit et al., 2004: 8-11). In this
respect the relationship of the EPP, PES and ALDE with the European
Council and the European Commission is one of the most determining
factors, considering their political weight in national governments.
On the eve of European Councils, EPP, PES and ALDE hold meetings of
partisan leaders (Hix, 1995; Hanley, 2004; Moschonas, 2004) bringing
together the most influential members of the same political family.
The European Greens on the other hand favour
relations with the Council of Ministers and its European Parliament
counterparts. The weak role of the remaining Europarties is explained
by the fact that there are very few representatives to the European
Council, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission in its
ranks. Overall, we see that most notably the following factors
condition Europarties’ influence over EU policy-making: the
numerical ascendance, the level of cohesiveness, and the domestic
political contexts (Lefkofridi and Katsanidou, 2014; Johansson,
2016).
A seminal change in the European elections 2014
were the Spitzenkandidaten,
who backed by the Europarties competed for the position of head of
the commission (on grounds of article
17 paragraph
7 TEU). If this
innovation is kept in place for 2019 (what heavily relies on how
the work of Juncker will be assessed)
the connection between voting and the election of the Commission
President remains intact. This will most definitely strengthen the
role of the Europarties as they are responsible for selecting and
nominating the candidates, while at the same time driving the
electoral campaigns more towards party politics, since Europarties
can rely on the actual relevance of their lead candidates.
Party
building in new democracies
The final and often overlooked area of research
focuses on activities of Europarties in part traversing the borders
of the European Union. The commitment of the Europarties in promoting
party development in post-Communist Europe has been viewed as their
“most impressive achievement to date” (Pridham, 2014: 30).
For instance various country studies examine the
accession of national parties to Europarties. For Bulgaria, Spirova
(2008) finds a direct impact on domestic party development. Timuş
studies Ukrainian domestic parties showing that the EPP has had “a
direct, though weak, influence on aspiring Ukrainian members because
of the low incentives, low degree of clarity of membership
requirements and context-specific factors” (2014: 51). In an
extensive systematic comparative analysis von dem Berge (2015)
convincingly illustrates the mechanisms through which the EPP and PES
succeeded in shaping programmatic platforms and organizational
structures of their partner parties in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.
Even if all official EU enlargement initiatives
are suspended at least for this legislative period, the independent
stance of Europarties allows them to nevertheless establish links to
the parties and party systems of candidate and neighbouring
countries, laying the groundwork for a possible future rapprochement
as well as promoting party democracy.
Looking ahead
In the European elections 2014 the Europarties
more or less stumbled into the new Spitzenkandidaten
instrument. Knowing now that the candidate representing the largest
party has a serious chance to capture the Commission presidency we
can expect that the parties will reconsider and reformulate their
rules and procedures to select their frontrunner for the next
elections. At the same time this position becomes more attractive to
prominent and senior politicians.
While in the run-up to 2014 there was hardly any
coordination between the candidates and formulation of the election
manifesto (Switek, 2015), this processes will be considerably more
intertwined in elections to come – amongst other things because the
candidates are interested in a coherent and convincing platform for
their campaign. The European wide TV debates will most certainly
garner far more attention (Dinter and Weissenbach, 2015). In sum this
will act as a push for an increase in intraparty democracy.
This alone has potential to change the role of the
Europarties in the institutional setting on European level as well as
their position vis-à-vis their member parties. But this development
goes hand in hand with a rising external pressure on the EU. The
bailout for Greece put the Euro crisis on hold, but did not dissolve
diverging views on questions of austerity and budget discipline. This
is joined by a historic challenge through the on-going refugee
crisis, which heavily wears on European solidarity and even
undermines up to date sacrosanct principles like the free movement of
European citizens.
This offers plenty material for intense debates
plus the long asked for polarisation and politicisation of European
politics (Bressanelli, 2013). The Europarties might offer just the
venue to channel these discussions and compete among each other in
offering diverse policy options, which might prove crucial for the
future development of the EU.
References
● Bardi, L. (1996) Transnational
Trends in European Parties and the 1994 Elections of the European
Parliament, Party
Politics 2 (1), 99-114.
● Berge, B. (2015) Im
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auf mittel- und osteuropäische Parteien.
Baden-Baden: Nomos.
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and Coherent? Profiling the Europarties in the 2009 European
Parliament Elections,
Journal of European Integration 35 (6), 653-668.
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Pictures: By Unknown USGS employee [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons; private; private.
Michael Kaeding is Professor for European
Integration and European Politics at the Institute for Political Science of the University of Duisburg-Essen and holds an “ad
personam” Jean Monnet chair.
| |
Niko Switek is research associate at the Institute for Political Science of the University of Duisburg-Essen (chair for Political Science with a focus on the Political System of the Federal Republic of Germany and Modern Theories of the State).
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The Future of the European Parties
1: Serienauftakt [DE]
2: Europäische Parteien: Von der Radnabe zum Netzwerk [DE] ● Reinhard Bütikofer
3: Europarties: up and growing or in decline? [DE / EN] ● Isabelle Hertner
4: On the Future Role of Europarties [DE / EN] ● Sir Graham Watson
5: Die europäischen Parteien als Verteidiger des europäischen Gemeinwohls [DE] ● Joseph Daul
6: Cocktail party or political party? On the future of the Pan-European parties [DE / EN] ● Julie Cantalou
7: « Il est naïf de penser que seules les directions de partis peuvent faire évoluer le débat vers plus d’Europe » [DE / FR] ● Gabriel Richard-Molard
8: Los partidos europeos y los límites y potenciales de Europa [DE / ES] ● Mar Garcia Sanz
9: Europarties – plentiful under-researched diamonds in the rough [DE / EN] ● Michael Kaeding and Niko Switek
10: Fédéraliser les partis d’une même famille politique [DE / FR] ● Pierre Jouvenat
1: Serienauftakt [DE]
2: Europäische Parteien: Von der Radnabe zum Netzwerk [DE] ● Reinhard Bütikofer
3: Europarties: up and growing or in decline? [DE / EN] ● Isabelle Hertner
4: On the Future Role of Europarties [DE / EN] ● Sir Graham Watson
5: Die europäischen Parteien als Verteidiger des europäischen Gemeinwohls [DE] ● Joseph Daul
6: Cocktail party or political party? On the future of the Pan-European parties [DE / EN] ● Julie Cantalou
7: « Il est naïf de penser que seules les directions de partis peuvent faire évoluer le débat vers plus d’Europe » [DE / FR] ● Gabriel Richard-Molard
8: Los partidos europeos y los límites y potenciales de Europa [DE / ES] ● Mar Garcia Sanz
9: Europarties – plentiful under-researched diamonds in the rough [DE / EN] ● Michael Kaeding and Niko Switek
10: Fédéraliser les partis d’une même famille politique [DE / FR] ● Pierre Jouvenat
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