By the end of 2017, the United Kingdom will carry out a referendum on the
withdrawal from the EU. Before that, Prime Minister David Cameron calls
for a reform of the Union, which the European Council will discuss
coming December. But what are the EU’s own interests in the “British
Question” and how should it respond to Cameron’s wishes? Representatives
from politics, science and civil society answer to this question here
in a series of guest articles. Today: Eleonora Poli. (To the start of the series.)
- “Italy will unlikely back any reforms which can obstacle greater unity among those countries willing to do so.”
In
the letter sent by Prime Minister David Cameron (Cons./AECR) to the
President of the European Council Donald Tusk (PO/EPP) on November 16
2015, the UK has underlined a list of reforms that the EU should
address in order to reassure Britons about the opportunity to keep
the EU membership. Among those, the UK is envisaging the recognition
that the EU is a multicurrency Union, that there should not be
discrimination based on currency and that decisions taken at the
Eurozone level should be voluntary and not compulsory for non-euro
member states.
Prime
Minister Cameron does not describe the precise legal means for
bringing such reforms into effect; these are indeed “a matter for
the negotiation”. Yet, such a negotiation is certainly going to be
difficult. Among European countries, there is less and less tolerance
for British demand for less European ties, and with its opt-outs from
the euro and the Schengen free travel area among others, the UK
appears to have already acquired a privileged position in the Union.
Italy
is for deepening the integration process
Yet,
in an article published by the Telegraph
in
October 2015, Italy was depicted as a country which could back some of the British
requests. This seems slightly paradoxical indeed the Italian
government has traditionally been engaged in deepening
the EU integration process. In a document presented in May 2015 to
the Council on Completing and Strengthening the EMU, Italy has in fact called for greater integration of fiscal, structural, social, and monetary policies.
Moreover,
with 72%
of Italian citizens believing that the EU should work towards common
defense and security strategies,
the Italian government supports
the development of a single foreign, security and defence
policy
aimed at stabilising European borders and meeting current
geopolitical challenges. In this respect,
current Prime Minister Matteo Renzi (PD/PES) is also an advocate of a Common
European Asylum System
and the development of coordinated strategies to face the immigration
crisis. Within this premises, it is evident that the Italian
government should be against the general possibility of individual
opt-outs from the Union such as those envisaged the UK.
Worried
about a political precedent
Yet, Italy
might grant some of Cameron’s requests for two reasons. On the one
hand, a full Brexit has the potential to create a political precedent
that could lead to national political instability by legitimising
euroskeptic parties or movements.
To date, the Five
Stars Movement (M5S/EFDD) and the League
of North (LN/MENF) have
already been campaigning on the need for a referendum on the euro in
Italy.
On
the other hand, the concession to Britain of some of the reforms
requests might be for the advantage of a greater integration. Indeed,
from an Italian point of view, the Union should develop towards a
model of concentric
circles,
which would
allow the countries wishing to achieve greater political and economic
integration to do so, without being blocked by more sceptical member
states. The latter would remain bound to the EU by the single market
and the existing acquis communautaire, but they would not have to accept further institutional assimilation.
Concentric
integration
In
this respect, Italy will unlikely back any reforms which can obstacle
greater unity among those countries willing to do so. For instance,
the creation of new safeguards for non-Eurozone members asked by
Cameron might be accepted by Italy as long as the latter do not
undermine the EMU and do not result in vetoes toward Eurozone policy
choices. Similarly, Italy is not in favour of introducing procedures
which might challenge the European decision-making process, the
intra-EU mobility or the effectiveness of EU institutions. Yet, it
might allow some forms of UK exemption from the “even-closer union”
Treaty clause, which, however, should not be removed.
Moreover,
the Italian government will support the UK’s demand for a more
competitive and less bureaucratic European governance. For instance,
Italy is already in favour of the European Commission Better
Regulation Package or the Capital Markets Union. Indeed, these are
key reforms for boosting the Common Market and economic development
throughout all member states.
Hoping
for a compromise
To
sum up, although the
negotiation is not going to be an easy process, Italy might grant
Cameron some of his requests. Indeed, a full Brexit might undermine
the European integration project more than a concentric-circles
Europe, which could allow further integration among countries willing
to do so. However, there are not many areas whereby Italy is aligned
with the UK. The hope is that member countries will be able to find a
compromise, which might well be for the great advantage of the EU.
Dr Eleonora
Poli is a researcher at the Istituto
Affari Internazionali
(IAI), where she is working on research projects dealing with the
political and institutional implications of the Eurozone crisis
and EU-Asia political economic relations. She is also a research fellow at
the City Political Economy Research Centre (CityPerc) and has worked
as consultant for IDS-Thomson Reuters and OSIFE. Eleonora Poli has recently
published a book, Antitrust
Institutions and Policies in the Globalising Economy
(Palgrave MacMillan, October 2015).
|
Related articles
1: Vor dem Austrittsreferendum: Wie soll die EU auf die britischen Forderungen reagieren?
2: Does the UK deserve a ‘special deal’? [DE/EN] ● Simon Usherwood
3: How the EU should respond to Cameron’s “renegotiation” [DE/EN] ● Michael Emerson
4: The UK wants to play cards: Stronger national parliaments in the EU [DE/EN] ● Valentin Kreilinger
5: Italy and Brexit [DE/EN] ● Eleonora Poli
1: Vor dem Austrittsreferendum: Wie soll die EU auf die britischen Forderungen reagieren?
2: Does the UK deserve a ‘special deal’? [DE/EN] ● Simon Usherwood
3: How the EU should respond to Cameron’s “renegotiation” [DE/EN] ● Michael Emerson
4: The UK wants to play cards: Stronger national parliaments in the EU [DE/EN] ● Valentin Kreilinger
5: Italy and Brexit [DE/EN] ● Eleonora Poli
Pictures: Number 10 [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0], via Flickr; private [all rights reserved].
Keine Kommentare:
Kommentar veröffentlichen
Kommentare sind hier herzlich willkommen und werden nach der Sichtung freigeschaltet. Auch wenn anonyme Kommentare technisch möglich sind, ist es für eine offene Diskussion hilfreich, wenn Sie Ihre Beiträge mit Ihrem Namen kennzeichnen. Um einen interessanten Gedankenaustausch zu ermöglichen, sollten sich Kommentare außerdem unmittelbar auf den Artikel beziehen und möglichst auf dessen Argumentation eingehen. Bitte haben Sie Verständnis, dass Meinungsäußerungen ohne einen klaren inhaltlichen Bezug zum Artikel hier in der Regel nicht veröffentlicht werden.