By the end of 2017, the United Kingdom will carry out a referendum on the withdrawal from the EU. Before that, Prime Minister David Cameron calls for a reform of the Union, which the European Council will discuss coming December. But what are the EU’s own interests in the “British Question” and how should it respond to Cameron’s wishes? Representatives from politics, science and civil society answer to this question here in a series of guest articles. Today: Simon Usherwood. (To the start of the series.)
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“An appreciation of our differences might make an appreciation of what we can do together all the more possible.”
With the unexpected re-election of David Cameron in May, the long-discussed referendum on British membership of the European Union became a reality. Since then, a twin-track methodology has been launched: one part to negotiate with European partners, another to build a public debate in the run-up to the vote itself.
It would be fair to say that all of this is a profoundly
Anglo-centric debate. Most other member states see this very much as a
situation of the UK’s own making, rather than anything that has been forced by
them. As the original ‘awkward partner’, the British have long been unhappy
about the process and the substance of integration and this current phase is
simply the next chapter in a generally unhappy history.
The thin Europeanisation of
British political debate
Moreover, the structure of the British debate has been very
inward-facing. Different voices in the UK speak primarily to each other, rather
than out to European counterparts or partners. When Europeans do try to
contribute, they are viewed with a mixture of suspicion and disdain: why does
it matter what some outsider thinks?
In part, this is a reflection of the thin Europeanisation of British
political debate. Issues and questions are framed very strongly in a national
way, with little consideration of the European dimension, which remains
‘somewhere else’. If there is an external comparator, then it is the US, which
provides a language and method of political life that is very distinct from
that of continental Europe.
All of this is necessary to understand when approaching the question
posed in the title. One of the key challenges facing Cameron (and other EU
leaders) is that they see the world in rather different ways, which will make
it even harder to reach an outcome that is mutually satisfactory.
A threat to Britishness?
From the British perspective, the debate is one about fairness. Many
in the Conservative party (and beyond) feel that they have been somehow tricked
into joining a club that has constantly gained more powers, at British expense,
both in terms of financing the budget and of losing sovereignty. The politics
of the Union, they argue, are not of consensus, but of a homogenisation that
threatens the very meaning of Britishness.
Alongside this, they point to a faltering Eurozone and an
institutional order that seems incapable of any decisive action. Particularly
in trade matters, they argue that a UK working alone would be more nimble, able
to negotiate preferential trade agreements with rising economic powers, with
none of the trade-offs necessitated by having to get the other 27 member states
on board too.
Extensive opt-outs
For many European counterparts, this all looks like special
pleading. The UK has already secured extensive opt-outs from the system: the
Euro, Schengen, Prüm, Justice & Home Affairs. In addition, the budget rebate – even
after its generalisation to other net contributors – remains particularly
advantageous to the UK, while the auto-exclusion from the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance is also not forgotten. In short, they ask, what
else is left to be changed?
Moreover, other member states reasonably wonder why they
shouldn’t be doing the same as the British. This is particularly true in the
context of treaty reform, which explains why Cameron seems to have rowed back
from pushing for this. While arguing that his self-imposed deadline of late 2017
for the referendum means that a formal renegotiation would be too difficult,
Cameron has at least had the sense to see that it would probably cause more
problems than it would solve, at home or away.
And this partly explains
why the perceptions of the situation are so different.
The UK has shaped the EU
more than the British realise
The structure of British
public debate about European integration has been one largely of indifference,
coloured by anxiety about what might be happening to them. In contrast to many
other member states, there is not really a sense that – as a member – the UK
can shape what is happening. The only options that seem to be presented are to
block or to fold: in the longer history of membership those who have sought to
play a constructive role, like Tony Blair, are frequently seen as deluded or
misguided.
The tragedy in all of this
is that the UK has been a leader and a shaper, much more than the British
realise. A good example is Margaret
Thatcher.
To most sceptics, Thatcher
is the epitome of fighting ‘Europe’ and defending the nation. But she was
actually much more considered than this, from her signing of the Single
European Act to her support for Eastern enlargement. If you take the time to
read her famous 1988 Bruges
speech – seen at the time as
a very strong challenge to the order of things – then you’ll note that all of her
five core principles are now very much part of the EU’s work today, from a
NATO-led defence to a drive for further market liberalisation.
Appreciate our differences
The British renegotiation
and referendum could be an excellent opportunity for all parties to recalibrate
their understandings and their rhetoric on European integration. Yes, the UK
has particularities that need to be noted and accommodated, since the EU is not
a coercive system of governance. However, that can only be done through a
mutual recognition (appropriately) of the needs and particularities of other
member states. Whatever might be thought by some, the aim of the European Union
isn’t to make a new state, but to support and complement member states.
If the referendum isn’t to
become just another staging post on an endless journey with no resolution for
the UK, then the debate has to change, in both the UK and elsewhere. An
appreciation of our differences might make an appreciation of what we can do
together all the more possible.
Dr Simon Usherwood is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the
University of Surrey. His work on euroscepticism and on British-EU relations
has been published in numerous journals and books. He blogs regularly on
related questions here.
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Related articles
1: Vor dem Austrittsreferendum: Wie soll die EU auf die britischen Forderungen reagieren?
2: Does the UK deserve a ‘special deal’? [DE/EN] ● Simon Usherwood
3: How the EU should respond to Cameron’s “renegotiation” [DE/EN] ● Michael Emerson
4: The UK wants to play cards: Stronger national parliaments in the EU [DE/EN] ● Valentin Kreilinger
5: Italy and Brexit [DE/EN] ● Eleonora Poli
1: Vor dem Austrittsreferendum: Wie soll die EU auf die britischen Forderungen reagieren?
2: Does the UK deserve a ‘special deal’? [DE/EN] ● Simon Usherwood
3: How the EU should respond to Cameron’s “renegotiation” [DE/EN] ● Michael Emerson
4: The UK wants to play cards: Stronger national parliaments in the EU [DE/EN] ● Valentin Kreilinger
5: Italy and Brexit [DE/EN] ● Eleonora Poli
Pictures: Dave Kellam [CC BY-SA 2.0], via Flickr; private [all rights reserved].
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